When the United Nations was being formed, the nations primarily responsible for the defeat of Germany and Japan sought assurances that “to the victors would go the spoils.”  Neither Churchill, Stalin nor Roosevelt would accept an international organization that did not guarantee the continued dominance of the US, UK and USSR over world affairs.  It was Roosevelt who insisted on expanding the winner’s circle to include France and China, though both Stalin and Churchill were skeptical of those nations’ abilities to conduct themselves as major powers.

            The Security Council was born from this planned oligarchy by the means of veto power for the five permanent members.  The Council was originally set up with six other seats which were to be filled by other UN members for two-year terms.  In 1965 the Council was expanded to its current size of 15.

             The Council’s composition, functions and powers are outlined in Chapters V - VII of the UN Charter.  Any student preparing to participate in a Model United Nations should read these chapters and work to understand how the Council has functioned over time.  This article will attempt to help you better understand the function of the Security Council by exposing some of the myths surrounding it. 

 ·         Myth #1:  The permanent members are the only delegates with any real power in the Council.  While the right to veto may seem to allow the permanent members to dominate substantive debate, it is simply a “negative power.”  In other words, permanent members may block any substantive action by the Council but cannot initiate any action on their own, since all decisions of the Council must be agreed upon by nine members.  “All” includes both substantive and procedural actions.  Consequently, even if all five permanent members agree to an action, they must convince at least four of the non-permanent members to concur or the action will be blocked.  There is no “majority” vote.

       The non-permanent members therefore control a “hidden veto.”  While it is not as easy for them to block substantive issues, the non-permanent members are as crucial to successful conflict resolution as the permanent five.  It is this “hidden veto” that keeps the permanent members from monopolizing the Council’s debate.

 ·         Myth #2:  If a permanent member is involved in a crisis, that member is denied a vote during the debate of that issue.  Article 27(3) states that “in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.”  The ambiguity of this language has prevented the establishment of any concrete rules regarding forced abstentions.  It is clear that only certain types of disputes are covered under Article 27(3).  Chapter VI and Article 52(3) deal with the pacific settlement of disputes and regional attempts at reaching or keeping the peace.  Which disputes fall under these categories, however, has proven an elusive question for diplomats.

       Keep in mind that no permanent member has ever been forced to abstain from voting; however, some members have voluntarily relinquished their right to vote on issues to which they were a party to the dispute.

·         Myth #3:  Since the Council decides which issues are procedural (hence not subject to veto) and which are substantive, the veto can be circumvented by declaring all issues procedural.  It is true that the Charter gives the Council the right to decide which issues are subject to veto and which are not.  The question of whether an issue is substantive, however, is itself subject to veto.  This safeguard was demanded by the permanent members during Charter negotiation to insure that their power could never be diminished.  There are ways, nonetheless, to make issues that are normally substantive not subject to veto.  Despite this, no permanent member would ever agree to such an action, however great the short-term gains, because of the long-term loss of power resulting from such undermining of the veto right.  

 ·         Myth #4:  The easiest way to circumvent a veto is to rush a vote while a permanent member is absent.  Since Article 28 mandates that it should function continuously, the Council decided early on that absences by any one member could not block Council action.  This decision allows the Council to function despite prolonged absences by a member resulting from either a decision to protest the current debate or to extenuating internal circumstances.  The Soviet Union tested this decision many times in the 1950s by walking out of debate and calling all subsequent Council decisions illegal;  however, as illustrated by the Korean War, the Council continued to function in the Soviet Union’s absence with profound consequences.

      These decisions were never intended or used to deliberately exclude a member from the voting process.  Permanent members would never sabotage another permanent member’s right to veto by forcing a vote during an absence which could not be called a protest.  Such actions would serve to undermine the veto power of the permanent members.  Furthermore, leaving debate in protest is an action that a member should take only in extenuating circumstances; such walkouts happen only rarely in the normal functioning of the Council.  If a permanent member walks out in the course of debate, the Council can assume that that member is voluntarily passing on its right to vote.  If, however, a delegate overstays lunch or has momentarily stepped out of the room, no member should ever rush a vote in the delegate’s absence.

·       Myth #5:  If a permanent member vetoes an action, the General Assembly can take up the issue and assume the powers of the Council under the “Uniting for Peace” resolution.  As a way to overcome constant Soviet vetoes in early 1950, the United States orchestrated the Uniting for Peace resolution which allows the General Assembly to make recommendations on a situation if Council action is blocked by a veto.  This does not in any way surrender the powers of the Council to the General Assembly.  Enforcement actions under Chapter VII of the Charter remain under the control of the Council, though the General Assembly may make recommendations to members.  Only the Council can mandate actions by members; consequently, the Uniting for Peace resolution does not lessen Council control.

·         Myth #6:  Non-Council members cannot really participate in Council debate, even if the member is a party to a dispute.  Article 32 of the Charter clearly declares that all states, whether UN members or not, shall be invited to participate without vote in Council debates if they are a party to the dispute.  The right to participate is extended to any nation the Council chooses to invite, even if they are not a party to the dispute.  In this case, however, the Council may block participation by a state should it so desire.  Non-members should generally be allowed to fully participate in debate.  Rules governing their participation, such as whether members will receive precedence on speaking lists or in questioning other speakers, are set by the Council:  the rules laid out in the Charter only specify that invited states may not vote on either procedural or substantive motions or make motions themselves.  As the Council generally allows invited states to participate to the fullest extent allowed under the Charter, debate can be extremely productive and conflict resolution can encompass (or even be orchestrated) by a non-member.

 Conclusion

             The Security Council is charged with maintaining peace and security.  As such, the role of each member supersedes its narrow self-interest.  Non-permanent members are elected according to geographic considerations.  They are, therefore, expected to take a regional view of issues before the Council.  Each member of the Council plays a vital role in the debate.  Permanent members are obligated to protect the power of the veto, and non-permanent members are obligated to look out for the interests of all non-permanent members.

             The Council embodies the principles of collective security.  And as the Cold War fades from memory, the Council’s nature will surely change from a superpower battle-ground to a legitimate broker for peace and security.